Cesar A Martinelli

Cesar A Martinelli

Cesar A Martinelli

Professor

Economic theory, game theory, and political economy

Cesar Martinelli is a professor of economics at George Mason University.  He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and an Economic Theory fellow.  He has published numerous articles in professional  journals, including The Review of Economic Studies, Theoretical Economics, The Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, The Journal of the European Economic Association and The International Economic Review.  Before joining George Mason, he held faculty appointments at ITAM and at Carlos IIII University in Madrid.  He has been a visitor at the University of Chicago (2011) and the University of Rochester (1997-1998). He obtained a PhD in economics at UCLA in 1983 and a BA in social sciences (economics) at the Catholic University in Peru in 1987

Current Research

Currently working on the problem of the simultaneous exploration of many alternatives (joint research with David Austen-Smith), cheating in incentivized interventions (with Susan Parker), electoral accountability (with John Duggan), political economy of media (with Alejandro Castaneda), and generalized revealed preference (with Mikhail Freer). 

Selected Publications

The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment and Responsiveness, with John Duggan, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Literature

A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice, with John Duggan, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 78 (2011) 640-666

Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program, with Susan W. Parker, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 7 (2009) 886-908

Group Formation and Voter Participation, with Helios Herrera, Theoretical Economics, vol. 1 (2006) 461-487

Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 129 (2006) 225-251

Expanded Publication List

Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions, with Alexander Elbittar, Andrei Gomberg, and Thomas R. Palfrey, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment and Responsiveness, with John Duggan, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Literature

Oligarchy, Democracy and State Capacity, with Helios Herrera, Economic Theory, vol. 52 (2013) 165-186

Information and Participation in Social Programs, with David Coady and Susan W. Parker, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 27 (2013) 149-170

A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice, with John Duggan, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 78 (2011) 640-666

Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program, with Susan W. Parker, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 7 (2009) 886-908

Bargaining over Public Goods, with Julio Dávila and Jan Eeckhout, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 11 (2009) 927-945

Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation, with Helios Herrera and David K. Levine, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92 (2008) 501-513

Do School Subsidies Promote Human Capital Accumulation among the Poor?, with Susan W. Parker, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 110 (2008) 261–276

Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 35 (2007) 315-335

When Are Stabilizations Delayed? Alesina-Drazen Revisited, with Raúl Escorza, European Economic Review, vol. 51 (2007) 1223-1245

Group Formation and Voter Participation, with Helios Herrera, Theoretical Economics, vol. 1 (2006) 461-487

Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 129 (2006) 225-251

Anonymity in Large Societies, with Andrei Gomberg and Ricard Torres, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25 (2005) 187-205

Should Transfers to Poor Families be Conditional on School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective, with Susan W. Parker, International Economic Review, vol. 44 (2003) 523-544

Simple Plurality versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19 (2002) 901-920

Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 105 (2002) 278-297
Policy Reversals: Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties, with Akihiko Matsui, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 4 (2002) 39-61

A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries, with John Duggan, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 37 (2001) 259-294

Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters, Public Choice, vol. 108 (2001) 147-167

Reputation with Noisy Precommitment, with David K. Levine, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 78 (1998) 55-75

Small Firms, Borrowing Constraints, and Reputation, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 33 (1997) 91-105

Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints, with Mariano Tommasi, Economics & Politics, vol. 9 (1997) 115-131

Education

1987 BA in Social Sciences (Economics), Catholic University of Peru

1991 MA in Economics, University of California, Los Angeles

1993 PhD in Economics, University of California, Los Angeles

Recent Presentations

“Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy,” London School of Economics, 2016

“Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions,” Behavioral Models of Politics Conference (University of Pittsburgh), 2016

“Political Economics of Broadcast Media,” Keynote Lecture at APET Workshop on Democracy, Public Policy, and Information (Deakin University, Melbourne), 2016

“Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy,” World Congress of the Econometric Society (Montreal), 2015

“Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy,” Keynote Lecture at the Peruvian Economic Association meeting (University of the Pacific, Lima), 2015

In the Media

Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program, with Susan W. Parker, featured in:

New York Times blog Freakonomics (June 23, 2008)

Radio program The Takeaway (June 24, 2008)

Dissertations Supervised

Mikhail Freer, Essays on Preference Extensions (2017)