ICES Experimental Economics Brown Bag Lecture
Gender as a Coordination Mechanism
Friday, October 9, 2026 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), Room 5075
The Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) presents an ICES Brown Bag Lecture featuring:
George Mason University
Gender as a Coordination Mechanism
Abstract
We present an experiment that investigates the role of gender as a strategic coordination mechanism. Gender presentation is readily observable in most humans and is thus a prime candidate for a coordination mechanism in low-information contexts. The experiment features a "battle of the sexes"-style coordination game where player avatars serve as gender signals. Expectations around gender norms introduce asymmetries to games that are otherwise strategically symmetrical; these asymmetries can then enable better-than-random coordination. Gender-enabled coordination strategies are categorized by how asymmetry is created: 1) norms around gender and payoffs (where players are of dissimilar gender and hierarchical gender norms may give one player a stronger claim to higher material payoff); and 2) associations between gender and choice substance (where choices may have strategically significant differences in gender associations). The availability and relative strengths of coordination strategies vary across game permutations in player avatars and choice substance; differences between players' predictions and realized coordination rates allow inferences regarding the use of these strategies and how they affect expected outcomes in terms of both efficiency and equity.
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