ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory
Moral Salience and Virtue Preferences
Friday, September 18, 2026 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM EDT
Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), 5075 (ICES Classroom)
The ICES Seminar in Experimental Economics and Game Theory of the Fall 2026 semester will feature:
Loyola Marymount University
Moral Salience and Virtue Preferences
Abstract
Many recent studies have revealed an economically and socially important paradox: people behave morally in certain situations but then behave immorally (or less morally) under conditions that differ for reasons that seem morally irrelevant. These patterns are inconsistent with both theories of rational self-interest and with theories that incorporate stable social preferences. This paper introduces a parsimonious and tractable theory of moral salience that, combined with a simple model of allocative preferences, is consistent, inter alia, with anomalies involving uncertainty, exit options, the ability to take from others, and the possibility to destroy or create earnings of others. Incentivized and survey experiments provide evidence on behavior and motives that support predictions of the theory and prove equivalent between the two empirical methods. The proposed framework is consistent with all anomalous and classic results examined, generates many explanations not found in alternative theories, and provides a formal framework consistent with other theoretical accounts, including those based on self-deception, context dependent norms, and social image. In addition, the theory is based on observable variables, specific enough to be empirically refutable, and consistent with an out-of-sample test of a new anomaly it predicts.
For more information about the Seminar Series, please visit the Seminar Schedule homepage.
