Three Essays in Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Jingnan Chen

Advisor: Daniel E Houser, PhD, Department of Economics

Committee Members: Kevin McCabe, Mary Rigdon

Vernon Smith Hall (formerly Metropolitan Building), #5075
April 30, 2014, 02:00 PM to 11:00 AM


Deception is part of many important economic interactions, for example, insurance claims, job interviews, labor negotiations, regulatory hearing, and tax compliance. In those settings, people may increase their expected material gain by providing information that they believe to be false, a behavior predicted by standard economic theory. Yet, life experience as well as recent academic literatures shows that sometimes people do tell the truth at a cost to self. This stands in contrast to standard economic theory. To better understand these behaviors, my current dissertation focuses on deception and commitment within the context of free-style communication, surveys the non-human primates literature, and contributes to our understanding of deception, promises, and justice judgement.