Quantitative Analysis of Virginia State Criminal Adjudication Processes

Phillip Tyler Cunningham

Advisor: Alex T Tabarrok, PhD, Department of Economics

Committee Members: Peter Leeson, Vincent Geloso

Online Location, Online
July 03, 2025, 07:00 AM to 08:00 AM

Abstract:

This dissertation investigates judicial behavior and sentencing disparities in Virginia, focusing on how institutional structures and extralegal factors - such as race, gender and age - influence outcomes in the state's uniquely seated court system. Grounded in the Focal Concerns Framework and Cumulative Disadvantage models, quantitative methods are applied to several composite felony sentencing datasets to assess judicial discretion, cumulative disadvantage, the impact of adjudication methods, and the effect of judicial elections on sentencing.

Chapter 1 examines historical reports of the existence of sentencing bias in Virginia's circuit court system in a post-sentencing reform environment and incorporates several tests of competing theories (e.g., Liberation Hypothesis, Chivalry Hypothesis; Evil Woman Hypothesis) behind observed incarceration and sentencing biases. The findings reveal significant gender bias in sentencing and statistically significant although not practically significant racial biases, while finding mixed results pertaining to the competing disparity hypotheses.

Chapter 2 applies the concept of cumulative disadvantage to study unequal conviction and sentencing outcomes for felony offenders in Virginia. Incorporating comprehensive case information to examine the effects of pretrial detention, sentencing, sentence length, and recidivism, findings show that racial disparities are almost entirely mitigated through the adjudicative process up to the point of sentencing, but substantial sentencing disparities exist which drive observed carceral disparities. Additionally, findings show gender disparities exist throughout the entire adjudicative process, and that the receipt or non-receipt of pretrial release imparts negative causal effects throughout the adjudicative process while increasing the likelihood of post-release recidivism.

Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of the Virginia judicial election mechanism, which is only 1 of 2 states that elects judges through a legislative majority, to assess whether judges alter their sentencing behaviors as their reelection approaches, and evaluates the interaction of judicial and prosecutorial election timelines to determine how interacting elections influence charging and sentencing determinations. Findings show that judges, particularly in more liberal jurisdictions, increase sentence length in the 2 quarters before their reelections, while prosecutors demonstrate stable behavior. Further tests show that while prosecutors demonstrate stable charging patterns, political party shifts, regardless of the losing and gaining party, result in increases to both plea rates and sentencing severity.