From Commodities to Cybernation: Three Essays on the Acceptance and Use of Money

Zane Mullins

Advisor: Lawrence H White, PhD, Department of Economics

Committee Members: Carlos D. Ramirez, Peter J. Boettke

Buchanan Hall, #D100
January 31, 2025, 01:00 PM to 04:00 PM

Abstract:

The first chapter investigates the convergence of Classical and Hellenistic Greek coinage to shared weight standards and aesthetic coin types. In the presence of heavily decentralized political structures, the competition between issuers resulted in an equilibrium in which improvements to the consistency and quality of money were sought after. This institutional development created an incentive structure that fortified adherence to international monetary standards and discouraged entropy due to debasement and the pursuit of short-sighted fiscal gains. The role of reputational incentives faced by the issuing state in determining coinage standards and aesthetic types is explored, as well as the benefits a reputable coinage conveyed to both issuers and users. I argue that the economic openness and competitive nature of coin issue in the period created a framework in which the imputation of fiduciary value to coinage stemmed from the generation of reputational quality.

The second chapter analyzes coinage from a sample of 80 of the most prominent Greek city-states. Data involving a total of 999 hoards and 160,007 coins from 550-300 BC were collected to discern the relative magnitude, consistency of issue, and distribution of Classical Greek coinages. Of the city-states in the sample, the data displays the widespread international use of several Classical Greek coinages. Most notable among these are the proliferation of Corinthian-style coinage in Sicily and Italy and the penetration of Athenian coinage into non-Greek areas such as the Levant, Far East, and Egypt. The international movement of coins is used to bolster other forms of evidence for trade between Mediterranean civilizations in antiquity. Imitations of the most successful internationally circulating coinages are also quantified and discussed.

The third chapter investigates the integration of stablecoins with contemporary payment systems. The policy decision to provide issuers with access to central bank reserves is assessed in its ability to mitigate common concerns. These include disintermediation, run, and counterparty risk between stablecoin issuers and the banking system. Alternate designs of the popular synthetic CBDC framework are discussed, such as the potential for designs only requiring partial collateralization with central bank reserves. Emphasis is placed on the importance of maintaining competitiveness in the market for payment systems.