Enterprise Hall, Room 318
November 30, 2009, 07:00 PM to 07:00 PM
This dissertation proposes an explanation for political cooperation that preserves the rational choice framework. In the model, voters can rationally choose to sacrifice their material self-interest on behalf of constructed moral norms.
Chapter 1 introduces the question; what accounts for cooperative behavior by voters. Chapter 2 analyzes two classes of cooperative behavior; the high rate of voting and the weakness of material self-interest as a predictor of voter preferences. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the proposed model; the key mechanisms are genetic influence on individual preferences and conflict between the goals of the individual and the goals of the group. Chapter 4 argues that evolutionary mechanisms for encouraging cooperation suggest an ability to choose to sacrifice material self-interest on behalf of fairness norms. In Chapter 5 I focus on groups’ creation of fairness norms to encourage cooperation among members. Chapter 6 discusses manipulation of fairness norms by individual leaders, and efforts to institutionalize their manipulation. In Chapter 7 I analyze six political speeches, concluding that the politicians’ style of appeal is consistent with the model; appeals to voter self-interest are blended with appeals to fairness rather than to kindness. Chapter 8 discusses political implications; because the model suggests that demagogues can convince voters to support policies that are both inefficient and vindictive, the model supports limits on democratic choice.