The Political Economy of the Israel Palestine Conflict: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

Michael Webb

Enterprise Hall, 318
June 01, 2008, 08:00 PM to 07:00 PM

Abstract:

The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians represents one of the most intractable conflicts of the 20th and now the 21st century. The duration of this conflict is particularly surprising given the zero sum nature of conflict, and the theoretical ability to achieve a more profitable state through negotiation. This dissertation employs the tools of public choice and evolutionary game theory to analyze this conflict. In particular, it examines how the institutional structures of the Israelis and the Palestinians perpetuate and exacerbate this conflict. Using a model with agents employing simple updating algorithms, this dissertation examines what conditions will perpetuate the conflict. Finally, it considers constitutional structures that might resolve the conflict, and the feasibility of implementing such structures.