Enterprise Hall, 318
December 03, 2006, 07:00 PM to 07:00 PM
This dissertation hypothesizes that members of Congress vote to redistribute wealth to their constituents rather than to enhance economic efficiency. To test this hypothesis, four congressional votes related to the Uruguay Round trade agreements - including votes on whether to extend "fast track" negotiating authority in 1991 and again in 1993, the vote on the Uruguay Round trade agreements (1994) and the vote on China's accession to the WTO (2000) - are analyzed to determine if members of Congress voted as hypothesized. It was found that Congress does vote to redistribute wealth to their constituents. Campaign contributions from business and labor political action committees do influence trade votes. Finally, this dissertation provides an analytical narrative of two cases brought before the dispute settlement panel of the World Trade Organization. Though as a formal matter, the dispute settlement system is only open to member states, private parties play a significant role in the dispute settlement process.