04:30 PM to 07:10 PM R
Carow Hall 01
Section Information for Spring 2015
Description of the course: The class analyzes structural econometric models of economics and politics. By “structural” model I mean cases where a researcher (i) builds a formal theoretic model, then (ii) derives a likelihood function from that model, then (iii) estimates parameters of the formal model by maximizing the likelihood function. Some particular structural models that the class will examine are: McFadden’s model of urban travel demand (the first example, as far as I am aware, of a logistic regression in social science), Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE scores for legislators, and McKelvey and Palfrey’s Quantal Response Equilibrium model to analyze game-theoretic interactions.
Prerequisites: The only pre-requisites for the course are that (i) the student know calculus and at least mildly enjoy it, (ii) the student understands probability very well, at least at the level that the student is well versed in things like probability density functions and cumulative distribution functions. It is also strongly advised that the student have some experience with statistics and econometrics – at least to the level of executing a probit or logistic regression. The student should also know some rudimentary aspects of game theory – e.g. what a Nash equilibrium is and how to solve for a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a simple game.
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Credits: 3
Enrollment limited to students with a class of Advanced to Candidacy, Graduate or Non-Degree.
Enrollment is limited to Graduate level students.
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